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NOTES
many other states maintain that the remedies are based on rad-
ically inconsistent theories of law and of the relation of the
facts and that hence the seller must elect which right he will
exercise.66 Unfortunately there is hopeless conflict as to what
is a binding election. 67 Missouri seems to have adopted the more
liberal, and probably better, rule that the mere bringing of an
action on which the seller was forced to take a nonsuit is not an
election. 68 It is possible that even where there is not a binding
election the seller may be estopped from asserting some of his
rights.
Although the present Missouri law on the remedies of the
conditional vendor seems to be largely satisfactory, certain stat-
utory changes would be wise. The Statute as to retaking should
be amended so as to apply to retakings from a person claiming
under the vendee as well as from the vendee and so as to allow a
reasonable deduction for obsolescence of the goods as well as for
their actual depreciation. The seller should probably be allowed
to continue to sue in equity to foreclose a lien, but the greatest
care should be used in the appointment of receivers, and they
should not be appointed merely because the property is subject
to greater depreciation and obsolescence while being used than
if it were stored. If this were done, the Missouri law would be
far superior to the more cumbersome system set up by the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act with its periods of redemption and
forced resales.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, '33.
POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION BY PARTY CONTROL
OVER PRIMARY ELECTIONS-Nixon v. Condon
The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State,
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
66 Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior Springs Bottling Co.
(Mo. App. 1914) 171 S. W. 940. Good case comment in (1915) 7 Mo. L.
BuLl. 44.
67 Cf. A. L. R. notes cited in n. 65.
68 Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior Springs Bottling Co.,
above. Sec. 24 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides: "Neither
the bringing of an action by the seller for the recovery of the whole or any
part of the purchase price, nor the recovery of a judgment in such action,
nor the collection of a portion of the price shall be deemed inconsistent with
a later retaking of the goods . . . But such right of retaking shall not be
exercised after he has collected the entire price, or after he has claimed a
lien on the good, or attached them, or levied upon them as the goods of the
buyer."
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The Fourteenth Amendment contains the following provision:
No State shall . . . deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.
These Amendments were passed for the purpose of guarantee-
ing to the newly emancipated negro race equality of rights, cer-
tainly so far as political matters were concerned; it was realized
that the former masters would not be satisfied to permit the new-
ly emancipated slaves to have equal voice in the control of the
government. To guard against any possible discrimination
against the negroes, the people incorporated their will into the
Constitution.
No sooner had these Amendments been passed than the white
people in the South began to devise methods to evade the pro-
scriptions of the Amendments. Statutes requiring literacy tests
for voters were passed in many states. But such tests are re-
quired also by many Northern states,' and there is nothing un-
constitutional or even undesirable in these tests. That very few
of the slaves or their children were literate was no ground for
attacking such a law, even though this fact may have been a rea-
son that prompted the Southern legislatures to enact a measure
requiring such a test.
Another device used widely by the Southern states from an
early date is that of requiring the payment of poll taxes. 2 Fail-
ure of the officials of a state to collect this tax from white people
does not render the taxing law itself discriminatory, since the
tax is assessed equally against every person, whether white or
black. The action of the administrative official may be attacked,
but not the law under which he acts.3
Mississippi devised the so-called "good understanding" clause.
Under this provision a voter must be able to read any part of the
state constitution or show that he has a good understanding of
it when read to him Such a statute was attacked in the case of
Williams v. Mississippi4 on the ground that too broad a discre-
tion was delegated to the administrative officials, who were to be
the judges of whether the voter read or understood the constitu-
tion satisfactorily, and also on the ground that the very purpose
in passing this constitutional provision was to enable the election
IMagruder, AmERICAN GOVERNMVNT (rev. ed. 1926) 407; Ogg & Ray,
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (4th ed. 1931) 189; Munro, TH1
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (3rd ed. 1931) 136.2 Ogg & Ray, op. cit. 189; Munro, op. cit. 138; Kimball, STATE AND MU-
NICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) 42. For examples see:
Const. Ala. 1901, Sec. 194; Const. Miss. 1890, Sec. 244; Const. Va. 1902, Sec.
38.
13 Williams v. Mississippi (1897) 170 U. S. 212.
4 Ibid.
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officials to discriminate against the negroes. The Supreme
Court decided that the clause did not delegate too broad a discre-
tion to an administrative official, and added that so long as a law
is not itself an unconstitutional delegation of authority, it does
not become unconstitutional simply because the officials acting
under its authority can and do administer it arbitrarily and in a
discriminatory way. As to this latter proposition of law the
Court no doubt was correct.
In 1915 the Supreme Court came to consider the famous
"grandfather clause." Many of the white people in the South
did not feel satisfied that white voters should be disqualified be-
cause of illiteracy; clauses were then enacted providing that any
person who was eligible to vote in this country or under any
other government before 1866 and any descendant of any such
person shall not be required to pass the literacy test. On behalf
of its constitutionality it was vigorously contended that the pro-
vision did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment because it did
not disqualify any person from voting because of race, color or
previous servitude; the qualification demanded of all voters, re-
gardless of race, was that they pass a literacy test, or in the al-
ternative, show that they or their ancestors were qualified voters
on a certain date. The Supreme Court, however, brushed aside
this syllogistic argument with the answer that as a practical
matter the purpose and effect of the clause was to prevent a
large number of people from voting because of their color and
therefore was contrary to the spirit of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.5
Such was the status of the law until Texas, in 1923, passed an
act providing that no negroes shall be allowed to vote in a Demo-
cratic primary. A negro, being refused the right to vote by rea-
son of this statute, contested its constitutionality. The Federal
District Court held that since a primary is different from an elec-
tion the law was constitutional. 6 This case was considered
authority for the point 7 until the same statute was again attacked
nearly two years later in Nixon v. Hendon. The same District
Court again held the statute constitutional. But the Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, said that it was
not necessary to consider whether the law violated the Fifteenth
Amendment because it was clearly in conflict with the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8
A very similar situation arose in Virginia. There the Assem-
bly, instead of directly forbidding negroes from voting in the
i Guinn and Beal v. United States (1915) 238 U. S. 347.
a Chandler v. Neff (D. C. W. D. Tex. 1924) 298 F. 515.
7 See Black, Am. IICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1927) 643.
8 Nixon v. Herndon (1926) 273 U. S. 536.
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Democratic primary, passed an act, in 1924, providing that each
party was to determine the qualifications of its own members.
Thereupon the executive committee of the Democratic party
passed a resolution that no negroes might be a member of. its
party so as to participate as such in the primaries. The Fed-
eral District Court in West v. Biley 9 held this unconstitutional,
saying that the State could not do indirectly what it could not do
directly. It pointed out that the State had regulated primaries
extensively and paid for them, and since primary elections had
so far become identified as an activity or function of the state,
it could not permit a political party to do anything in the con-
duct of a primary which the State itself could not do directly
under the Federal Constitution. The Court observed that even
though the laws of Virginia did not require a political party to
nominate its candidates by the direct primary, yet if it chose to
use this method, the conduct of a primary had become so far
regulated and controlled by the State that any discrimination in
allowing people to vote must be looked upon more as the act of
the State than as the private affair of a voluntary association.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, approving
the reasons advanced, and added, "If all the political parties in
the state of Virginia incorporated the same qualifications in
their rules and regulations as did the Democratic party, nobody
could participate in the primary, except white persons, and other
races would thereby be deprived of a material right guaranteed
to them under the Constitution as amended, that is, the right to
participate in the selection of candidates to be voted for in the
election."o
The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Hern-
don had been unfavorably received by the people of Texas. The
Legislature immediately repealed the law which had been held
unconstitutional and passed a new act similar to the Virginia
statute above. Then, just as in Virginia, the Democratic state
executive committee passed a resolution to the effect that no
negroes were to vote in the Democratic primary. This statute
and the action of the Democratic party were held not to violate
the Federal Constitution by the District Court for the Western
Districf of Texas in the case of Nixon v. Condon."1 This Court,
it will be recalled, was the same Court that sustained the statute
which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in Nixon v.
Hendon. The Condon case was appealed to the Circuit Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Appellant called the court's atten-
tion to the prior case of West v. Biley decided by the Virginia
9 West v. Biley (D. C. E. D. Va. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 177.
10 West v. Biley (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 42 F. (2d) 101.
11 Nixon v. Condon (D. C. W. D. Tex. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 464.
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District Court and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit. The court attempted to distinguish this case
from that one decided by the Fourth Circuit Court on the ground
that in Virginia the expense of conducting primaries is paid by
the State and not by parties, as in Texas, and affirmed the deci-
sion below.' 2 The case on which the Court based its distinction
was the Texas decision of Waples v. Marrast13 holding that a
statute providing for payment for primaries by the State was
unconstitutional as a tax imposed for a non-public purpose. The
expense of holding a primary is generally paid by the states, not
by the parties, 14 and this Texas decision was out of line with the
decided weight of authority to the effect that the conduct of a
primary is so much a public task or quasi-public task that such
an expenditure by the commonwealth is proper.1 5 The result
reached in the Waples case was not only out of line with that
reached in other jurisdictions but seems to be inconsistent with
the general attitude of that State toward political parties and
primaries. The State of Texas has taken over the control of
primaries to the extent of requiring all parties having polled
over one hundred thousand votes in the last previous election to
nominate by primary, 16 and of prescribing the time'7 and place' s
of holding them, as well as the type of ballot to be used.' 9 The
State also dictates what the organic structure of parties shall be;
and such regulation has been approved by the courts of that
State.20 So the two cases can hardly be distinguished on the
ground that now in Texas, as a result of the Waples case, pri-
maries are paid for by the political parties rather than by the
State, as is done in Virginia and generally in other states. The
proposition on which the Circuit Court of Appeals passing on
this Nixon case has based its decision is that a political party is
a voluntary association, not in any respect a governmental
agency, and therefore its action in prescribing the qualifications
for voters at primaries cannot come under the ban of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The realistic answer of the
Virginia District Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
is that since states have so far taken over primaries in regulat-
12 Nixon v. Oondon (C. C. A. 5, 1930) 49 F. (2d) 1012.
Is (1916) 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180.
it Ogg & Ray, op. cit. 850; Beard, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
(6th ed. 1931) 545; Kimball, op. cit. 66.
'$State v. Felton (1908) 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85; State v. Michel
(1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430.
16 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3101.
17 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3102.
Is Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3103.
19 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3109.
20 Briscoe v. Boyle (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) 286 S. W. 275.
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ing them in various aspects, the primary has become assimilated
to a function of the state and the state may not permit a political
party under its supervision to discriminate improperly to ef-
fectuate a result indirectly which it could not reach directly.
That the statement of the court in the Virginia case, that the
plan was an attempt to do indirectly what could not be done
directly, is true is easily shown by the fact that this plan was
devised in Texas as soon as the Supreme Court had held the
statute directly disqualifying negroes void. Should the distinc-
tion perceived by the Circuit Court which decided the Texas
case between the situation of a state in which primaries are paid
for by parties and one in which the expense is borne by the state
be considered a true one, it would be a simple matter for those
Southern states whose desire of disfranchising the negro is
great enough, to pass laws that primaries shall be paid for by
the political parties, and then effectuate the disqualification of
negroes by action of the party committees. In many Southern
states where nomination on the Democratic ticket practically
means election, at least so far as state offices are concerned, the
undeniable result would be a disfranchisement of millions of
people because of their color.
That the action of a political party in disqualifying a person as
a voter at a primary election because of his color falls directly
within the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment and the
"equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
-view supported by sound legal basis cannot be doubted. The
main reasons advanced by the Texas District Court and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment,
resolve themselves into two main arguments, one applicable to
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the other
to the Fifteenth Amendment alone.
The only theory on which it is contended that the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as the Fifteenth is not violated is that both
Amendments enjoin action by a state, while a political party is
for all purposes simply a voluntary association, an entirely non-
governmental agency. To illustrate the fallacy of this, it is
necessary only to refer to a simple illustration. If an associa-
tion organized, let us say, for the betterment of child welfare
should refuse a person membership because he is a negro,
the state is not concerned. On the other hand, if judges in a
primary election refuse to let a person vote, that is a matter of a
governmental nature. The opinion of the Court in the Condon
case drew a sharp line and placed the state and its directly gov-
ernmental agencies on one side and all other bodies, agencies or
individuals on the other; and the distinction is preserved regard-
less of the nature or function of the latter. To dispose of the
problem by describing the political party as a "voluntary asso-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss2/7
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ciation" is no more than a statement of the result reached; legal
dogma is asserted, not to promote the intended result of the
Amendments, but to defeat their aim. In any event, to meet the
legal dogma, it may be asserted that a political party is not an
ordinary voluntary association removed from the sphere of state
action. It would be more accurate to describe it as a quasi-
governmental agency, though in a number of respects it has the
attributes of a voluntary association. Though in its organiza-
tion and choice of views it is relatively unrestricted and free in
its action, yet when it undertakes the control of the primary
election its action becomes of the utmost public significance as a
device of representative government. Ultimately there is little
difference between the function of the direct primary election
and that performed by the secondary or final election, except as
to proximity to the result. Both are regulated to about the
same extent, indicating at least a tacit acceptance of the primary
as a substantial governmental institution. At the present time
primaries are controlled by the states in regard to the limit of
campaign expenses, the type of ballot used, voters' qualifications,
the time and place for holding such primary elections, and in
other respects. 2 1 They are generally held at the expense of the
government, as would have been the case in Texas except for the
questionable decision by the Texas court that this was a tax
levied for a non-public purpose. It may be said fairly that
primary elections are now conducted by the state in virtually
the same manner as final elections, and any part that the polit-
ical party may play in them may be considered a governmental
function. This view is strengthened by the fact that today the
political party is regulated by the state in regard to its organiza-
tion or make-up, its activities in campaigns, the amount of
money it spends and in other matters to the most minute de-
gree.22 In a recent text on political parties 23 a compilation of
the cases by the authors indicated a tendency of the courts in the
early cases to look dubiously upon the supervisory regulation of
parties attempted by the legislatures, because of the courts' con-
cept of a political party as a private voluntary association. But
the tendency was soon reversed toward a liberal view point in
the later cases, until in the past few years, practically every kind
of regulation of the most supervisory character has been sus-
tained.2 4 No better statement can be found describing the
21 Ogg & Ray, op. cit. 850; Beard, op. cit. 541, 543-549; Merriam & Gos-
nell, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM (rev. ed. 1929) 244-245.
22 Ogg & Ray, op. cit. 853-4; Beard, op. cit. 538-543; Merriam & Gosnell,
op. cit. 244.
23 Merriam & GosneU, op. cit.
24 Ibid. 266-270.
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present attitude of the courts toward political parties, at least
in regard to their activity in primary elections, than in the fol-
lowing conclusion of the authors:
The theory of the party as a voluntary association has
been completely overthrown by the contrary doctrine that
the party is in reality a governmental agency, subject to
legal regulation and control. 25
But the acts complained of in this Nixoi case seem to violate
not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Fifteenth as well.
To avoid the proscription of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Dis-
trict Court advanced, in addition to the proposition that a party
is a voluntary association, the further argument that the Fif-
teenth Amendment guarantees the right to vote at a final elec-
tion, not at a primary election. It rested this -argument pri-
marily on the case of Newberry v. United States.20 In that case
Congress, under the authority conferred on it by Article 1 Sec-
tion 4, of the Constitution, dealing with elections to Congress,
passed a law regulating primaries. Although the effect of the
decision was to exclude the primary from an "election" yet this
proposition of law was never asserted by a majority of the Su-
preme Court. Four justices based their decision on this point,
while four dissented; the ninth, while concurring in the result in
the particular case, never concurred in this principle of law an-
nounced by the other four majority judges. However, even if a
majority had concurred in this view, construction of the Fif-
teenth Amendment would not be free from doubt. The language
of the constitutional provision then under consideration was,
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives . . ." The Fifteenth Amendment
provides, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote27
shall not be denied or abridged . . ." The argument that the
word "vote" means the right to vote at final elections only must
rest on the argument that the right to vote guaranteed by this
Amendment was the right to vote as it then existed, there be-
ing no primaries at that time. But if this were true, a negro
could not claim that the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees to him
the right to vote for a United States Senator, because at the time
when the Fifteenth Amendment was passed United States Sena-
tors were elected by the state legislatures, not by vote of the
25 Ibid. 269. "Primary election statutes are based on a recognition of
political parties as governmental agencies . . ." Baer v. Gore (1916) 79
W. Va. 50, at 58, 90 S. E. 530, at 533. See also: Ogg & Ray,-op. cit. 853;
Kimball, op. cit. 46-47.
26 (1921) 256 U. S. 232.
27 Writer's italics.
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people. To say that the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment
intended to guarantee the right to vote only in final elections is
just as much a matter of conjecture as to say that they intended
to protect the right to vote in primary elections as well as final
elections. At the time that the Amendment was ratified the
only election by the people was the general election. As the
population grew and the number of officials to be chosen by the
voters increased, the election machinery changed by necessity to
consist of two steps, the first, a primary election in which the
minor candidates are eliminated, and the second a final elimina-
tion or election between the major candidates. In many states
nomination on the Democratic ticket means practically election.
In other states the same is true of nomination on the Republican
ticket. The framers of the Amendment used as broad and gen-
eral terms as were possible. It does not seem probable that it
was their intention that the right of a negro to participate in
the actual election of public officials should be restricted by the
unforeseen development in the later elective process.
Certiorari has been granted in this case by the Supreme
Court. In view of the foregoing consideration, it is by no
means certain that the decision will be affirmed.
JOSEPH FEIGENBAUM, '32.
Smyth v. Ames IN THE SUPREME COURT
The rugged and to a great extent the ruthless individualism of
this country received a decided shock by the opinion of the Su-
preme Court in Munn v. Ilinois,' upholding the right of the
state legislature to regulate the rates of a company whose busi-
ness was such as to be affected with a public interest. The legis-
lature of Illinois prescribed the maximum rates which certain
grain elevator companies could charge. In addition to the at-
tack on the validity of state regulation, the company attacked the
constitutionality of the rate, insisting, among other things, that
it was the duty of the Supreme Court to decide whether the pre-
scribed rates would amount to a taking of property without due
process of law. To this the court answered:
It is insisted, however, that the owner of property is en-
titled to a reasonable compensation for its use even though
it be clothed with a public interest, and that what is reason-
able is a judicial and not a legislative question.
As has already been shown, the practice has been other-
wise. In countries where the common law rule prevails, it
has been customary from time immemorial for the legisla-
1 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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